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by Joelle Anne Moreno
oes your mother know the difference between
crack and cocaine? Can you describe how they are
packaged and sold? Many judges seem to b lieve
that until "every person sworn on a federal jury under-
stands the relationship between crack and powder cocaine,
or the different methods employed by drug dealers operat-
ing at various levels of the distribution chain," courts
should continue to allow prosecutors to rely on "drug jar-
gon expert" testimony from police officers and federal
agents. (United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 124 (2d
Cir. 2005).)
Since the United States embarked on its "war on
drugs" in thel980s, law enforcement officers have rou-
tinely been allowed to testify as expert and nonexpert wit-
nesses as to their opinions on how drug dealers operate
Joelle Anne Moreno, a professor at New England School of Law,
is the author of numerous articles addressing the standards that
should govern the admission and use of expert testimony. She is
also a member of the Executive Committee of the Evidence Section
of the Association ofAmerican Law Schools and the Law Profes-
sors'Section of the Hispanic National Bar Association.
and how to translate drug jargon. From the government's
perspective, this practice makes perfect sense. Opinion
testimony by police and federal agents aligned with the
prosecution can ensure that jurors draw inculpatory con-
clusions from a defendant's ambiguous behavior and com-
munications. Faced with a choice, a prosecutor will
always prefer the cop to cooperating witnesses, who prob-
ably participated in the underlying crime, cut a deal, and
have their own criminal history. Even when cooperating
witnesses appear credible, they will only be allowed to
testify to events that they personally witnessed. Police
officers have none of this baggage, and their opinions can
exert a powerful influence on the jury.
When the court qualifies a detective or case agent as an
expert, the prosecutor secures the added benefit of a judicial
imprimatur of reliability and neutrality that enhances all of
the officer's testimony. Prosecutors who elicit opinion testi-
mony from police witnesses avoid the personal perception
limits of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. And when the opin-
ion testimony comes from a nonexpert police witness, pros-
ecutors circumvent the discovery requirement that applies
to all experts. (FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.) Given these strategic
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advantages, it is no surprise that the most common prosecu-
tion expert witness in all state and federal narcotics trials is
a law enforcement officer. (See Jennifer L. Groscup et al.,
The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 345 (2002).)
When prosecutors have unfettered access to police
opinion testimony they gain an unfair advantage over the
defense. Although, to date, the use of police experts is
most common in narcotics cases, judicial laxity may have
broader implications in the future. As prosecution efforts
shift in response to new political and social pressures,
judges may be equally inclined to defer to police experts
in prosecutions for other crimes. This suggests that
defense counsel will need to develop more aggressive
strategies to challenge the admission of police witness
opinion testimony.
Three basic assumptions
The drug jargon expert has become a courtroom regu-
lar because prosecutors, judges, and the public share three
basic assumptions:
1. Drug dealers regularly use drug jargon.
2. Jurors cannot understand drug jargon without expert
assistance.
3. Police officers can identify and accurately translate
drug jargon.
First, we assumed that drug dealers speak in jargon-
an assumption shared by the federal circuits, see United
States v. Pinillos-Prieto et al., No. 03-1566, 2005 WL
1969977 (1st Cir. August 17, 2005) ("[D]rug dealers sel-
dom negotiate the terms of their transactions with the
same clarity as business persons") and United States v.
Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2002), and that prose-
cutors need "government agents to describe the character-
istics and operating methods of narcotics dealers,"
because they use "codes and jargon developed by the drug
dealers to camouflage their activities." (United States v.
Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir.1991).) This view
is also common in state narcotics prosecutions. (See, e.g.,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Vitale, 664 A.2d 999,
1001 (Penn. 1995).) In fact, this belief is so pervasive that
a 2000 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence
specifically contemplate the admission of expert evidence
from the "law enforcement agent [who] testifies regarding
the use of code words in a drug transaction" based on the
"principle" that drug dealers "regularly use code words to
conceal the nature of their activities." (FED. R. EVID. 702,
advisory committee's note.) Once federal and state trial
judges routinely start from the premise that drug dealers
use coded language, they must then decide whether jurors
can understand drug jargon evidence. Most judges assume
they cannot.
Under Rule 702 and the state code equivalents, propo-
nents of expert evidence must convince the court that it
will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue." Federal courts unanimously
agree that "the jargon of the narcotics trade and the code
that drug dealers often use ... are certainly beyond the
ken of the average juror." (United States v. Coleman, No.
99-50018, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18004, at *10 (9th Cir.
Aug. 7, 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1147 (2002).) It is
typical of state courts as well. (See, e.g., Thornton v. State,
570 So. 2d 762, 771 (Ala. 1990).) Without requiring any
evidence from the prosecutor, judges seem to agree that
drug jargon is always incompressible. Once judges pre-
sume that drug dealers speak in jargon and that the jargon
is unintelligible, the prosecutor need only persuade the
court to admit the opinion testimony of a police witness.
This leads to the third assumption -police officers can
identify and accurately translate drug jargon. Judges have
become such true believers in police jargon expertise that
they will ridicule defense challenges based on a police
officer's or federal agent's of lacks training or specific
drug language education. Although judges would view
these deficits as fatal to almost any other type of expert,
when the expert is a cop, some judges have referred to
defense concerns as "silly" and chided defense counsel for
failing to realize that "on-the-job experience, [is] the best
education there is for this type of thing." (United States v.
Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996).) (Also see
United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir.
1987) ("[H]ard core drug trafficking scarcely lends itself
to ivied halls."))
It is impossible to reconcile the post-Daubert regime of
enhanced judicial scrutiny of expert testimony with judges
who allow police witnesses to testify as if they were mind
readers, as in these examples:
- A defendant who used the terms "pianos," "boyfriends,"
"briefs," or "motions," clearly meant "heroin." (United States
v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997);
- A defendant who rolled up his pants leg was signal-
ing that he had drugs for sale. (United States v. Harris,
192 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1999).
- A defendant's proximity to a loaded gun at the time
of arrest was significant because "guns play a role in drug
distribution, as dealers carry them for protection and
intimidation purposes." (United States v. Swafford, 385
F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 2004).
- A defendant who said "I was on that last night, plus
we're going to be on that tonight," really meant that he
was planning to "locate or find some individual and hurt
them." (United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 210 (3d Cir.
1999).)
The argument here is not intended to advocate a blan-
ket exclusion of drug jargon testimony. When police wit-
nesses are able to substantiate their claims of expertise
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and, in cases where jurors need help understanding rele-
vant facts, police experts should be permitted to provide
carefully limited opinion testimony. But judges have
become too reluctant to scrutinize the expertise if the wit-
ness who arrives in court has a badge and a gun. We need
to do a better job of recognizing and challenging the three
basic assumptions that have guided the courts. Given the
existing case law, these challenges are most likely to be
effective if they focus on efforts to bar (1) the nonexpert
police witness from providing drug jargon testimony; (2)
the case agent from also testifying as an expert witness;
(3) propensity evidence; and (4) improper efforts to admit
a defendant's prior crimes and bad acts to establish a gen-
eral familiarity with drug jargon.
Do drug dealers always use jargon?
There is no empirical evidence that can answer the
question of whether drug dealers regularly use jargon
because the identification of drug jargon is not a real field
of study. There is no relevant social science or linguistic
literature that reflects any effort
to study or test the existence of
drug jargon or the accuracy of udg
its purported translations,
although it is not an impossible
task. Empirical research could reluc
ascertain whether drug jargon
definitions offered by law scrutinize
enforcement are widely accept-
ed, whether they are correct, w ho a r ri
and whether particular words
have a covert, drug-related badge a 
meaning limited to certain cul-
tures, geographic regions, or
languages. But the only
research I found was a single study demonstrating that
drug jargon has clear geographic boundaries. (See
Lawrence J. Ouellet, Henry H. Cagle & Dennis G. Fisher,
"Crack" versus "Rock" Cocaine: The Importance of
Local Nomenclature in Drug Research and Education, 24
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 219 (1997).)
Until we have better research, we should not confuse
lists of drug terms with valid empirical data. These lists
are easily accessible, and entertaining, though their origins
make them highly suspect. For example, the President's
Office of National Drug Policy Web site (www.white-
housedrugpolicy.gov) offers the following definitions: an
"amp head" takes LSD, a "beamer" smokes crack, and
"cabbage head" is an omnivorous drug user. According to
the list, if someone asks "Are you anywhere?" the individ-
ual is not lost but is asking if you have marijuana. The
White House list contains many drug names that have
become part of our common vernacular, such as "speed,"
E
n
"blow," "crank," and "weed," that jurors would need no
assistance to understand. But the list goes far beyond
these well-accepted terms and purports to translate more
than 2,300 words into covert drug jargon. This boast can-
not be substantiated. The list itself provides no informa-
tion about how, when, or where these examples of street
drug language are used. This particular list has not been
updated in three years. Lists of this type, on their face,
cannot reliably support the assumption that drug dealers
regularly use drug jargon nor the accuracy of any of the
collected terms.
I suspect that the primary reason that courts so readily
assume that jargon is a common component of drug deals
is that for decades police officers have been allowed to
testify as drug jargon experts in narcotics cases. This con-
clusion is circular and unsound. That judges routinely
allow police witnesses to translate drug jargon tells us
nothing as to how common jargon is in drug deals but
only that jargon translations are common in drug trials.
Defense against claim that
jurors need translators
s a re The Advisory Committee's
note to the Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 states that expert
ant to opinions should be admitted
only when "[a]n intelligent
Wvitnesses evaluation of the facts is ...
difficult or impossible without
e w ith a the application of some scien-
tific, technical, or other spe-
d a un cialized knowledge." In thed g Ipast, judges have simply
accepted prosecutors' argu-
ments that drug jargon expert
testimony was the type of specialized knowledge that all
jurors would need to understand the evidence and facts.
(See, e.g., United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th
Cir. 1996) ("There is no more reason to expect unassisted
jurors to understand drug dealers' cryptic slang than
antitrust theory or asbestosis.")) Defense counsel should
look to some
recent cases from the Second Circuit to counteract this
assumption.
In 2002, the Second Circuit developed a series of ques-
tions that judges can use to determine whether drug jargon
testimony should be admitted and, when it is admitted,
how to control its scope. (Garcia, 291 F.3d at 127).)
Although Garcia involved nonexpert opinion testimony
from a police officer, the guidelines should apply to both
expert and nonexpert testimony. According to the Second
Circuit, judges should exclude drug jargon testimony
whenever the defendant's conversation concerns "a legiti-
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mate topic"; is spoken "clearly and in full sentences";
uses "words that make sense contextually"; is "not con-
fusing and disjointed"; and does not involve "unusually
short or cryptic statements ... sharp and abbreviated lan-
guage, unfinished sentences, or ambiguous references."
(Id. at 142.)
These guidelines are consistent with the court's finding
that the prosecution can only rely on drug jargon transla-
tion evidence when the defendant's language is patently
unintelligible. Otherwise,
[i]n order to allow lay opinion testimony interpret-
ing a facially coherent conversation such as this, the
government would have to establish a foundation
that called into question the apparent coherence of
the conversation so that it no longer seemed clear,
coherent, or legitimate. Without a foundation creat-
ing doubt about what seemed to be obvious, it is
unlikely that opinion testimony would be helpful to
the jury.
(id.)
According to the Second Circuit, judges who admit police
opinion testimony, without requiring the prosecutor to
prove that the defendant's statements are incoherent,
allow the government "to direct the jury what to conclude
on a matter that it should decide in the first instance." (Id.)
The Garcia decision also provides support for future
defense challenges based on the lack of an explicit preex-
isting agreement by the defendant to speak in jargon.
According to the court, "[w]hen a conversation has a
legitimate purpose understandable to a lay person, testi-
mony about a code without some evidence of prearrange-
ment or some other foundation is inappropriate." (Id. at
141.) In Garcia, the Second Circuit became the first feder-
al appellate court to truly recognize the danger of uncon-
trolled drug jargon expertise. According to the court,
"[u]nless courts require the proponents of such testimony
to lay a proper foundation concerning personal knowl-
edge, every conversation could be interpreted as coded."
(Id. at 141-42.)
The Second Circuit has continued to develop and refine
its admissibility guidelines for drug jargon testimony in
newer cases. Read together, they seem to embrace two
fundamental organizing principles. First, drug jargon testi-
mony is only admissible if the police witness is restricted
to the translation of specific drug code that has a demon-
strable and fixed meaning, either in the drug trade general-
ly or in the transaction at issue. (United States v.
Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (Drug jargon
experts must be limited to interpreting "words of the
trade, jargon, and the general practices of drug dealers."))
Second, the witness cannot opine about the meaning of
the defendant's conversations generally, about the defen-
dant's conduct, or translate ambiguous statements (or any
other statements) that are not demonstrably drug code.
For example, according to the Second Circuit, a drug
jargon expert should not translate the phrase "to watch
someone's back" to mean being a lookout for a narcotics
transaction, United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 193 (2d
Cir. 2004), because the phrase is "neither coded nor eso-
teric." (Id. at 193.) Nor is the expert allowed to tell a jury
that the statement, "what's left over there in that can,"
probably referred to "bundles of heroin." (Dukagjini, 326
F.3d at 55-56.) The court offered two reasons to exclude
such testimony: (1) a witness cannot "essentially use[] his
knowledge of the case file and witness interviews ... to
conclude that they were discussing heroin" (id. at 55); and
(2) "[t]here was no evidence that these phrases were drug
code with fixed meaning either within the narcotics world
or within this particular conspiracy." (Id. at 56.) In addi-
tion, drug jargon experts should not be allowed to offer
"sweeping conclusions and interpretations about the gen-
eral meaning of conversations." (Id. at 50.) An expert can-
not provide a summary of the defendant's communica-
tions, even when it is presented at the beginning of trial as
an overview of anticipated evidence, United States v.
Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 2005), because it pro-
vides the government with the opportunity to have "a case
agent offer a summary opinion as to culpability before
any evidence to support such a conclusion has been pre-
sented for jury review." (Id. at 214; see also United States
v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 751 (2d Cir. 2004).) The court
concluded that were such summary testimony allowed,
"there would be no need for the trial jury to review per-
sonally any evidence at all" because the expert "could not
only tell them what was in the evidence but tell them what
inferences to draw from it." (Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750.)
Defense counsel should rely on these new cases to
argue that drug jargon opinion testimony should only be
admitted when the prosecution has established certain
threshold criteria: 1) that the defendant's communications
are facially incoherent, 2) that the alleged drug jargon has
a demonstrable and fixed meaning, 3) the existence of an
explicit agreement by the defendant to use drug code, and
4) that the police witness will not summarize the defen-
dant's conversations or conduct. Only when the prosecu-
tor has met this burden, and the court has ascertained that
the proffered testimony will be reliable, should any drug
jargon opinion testimony be admitted.
Are police reliable translators?
Judges may sometimes need to be reminded that unreli-
able evidence cannot be admitted, despite the seduction of
its apparent relevance. Imagine that, based on a crystal
ball reading, a fortuneteller is called to a murder trial to
identify the defendant as the killer. Federal Rule of
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Evidence 401 does not bar the fortuneteller's testimony
because it lacks "any tendency to make any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable." The testimony is excluded because
the fortuneteller's methods-and thus the conclusions-
lack the requisite reliability. Thus, the proponent of expert
testimony need not prove that the opinions offered are
correct, but that the opinion testimony will be reliable
based on a preponderance of the evidence. The standards
governing reliability have changed dramatically in the 12
years since Daubert was decided by the Supreme Court.
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).) Under the current standard, federal judges,
and judges from the 30-plus states that have adopted
Daubert-equivalents, must conduct a scrupulous pretrial
assessment of challenged expert testimony. For the past
six years, this new gatekeeping requirement has specifi-
cally included nonscientific
"specialized" evidence. (See
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999).) These
changes are also reflected in
the 2000 amendments to
Federal Rules of Evidence 701
and 702. Any reasonable read-
ing of the Daubert/Kumho/Rule
702 reliability standards
requires trial judges to inde-
pendently assess the reliability
of the "specialized knowledge"
offered by drug jargon experts and not pass the buck to
juries by labeling this a question of weight.
Unlike most scientific or technical expertise, which is
often grounded in education and training, drug jargon
expertise is experience-based. Although amended Rule
702 specifically contemplates the admission of experi-
ence-based expert testimony, such as "when a law
enforcement agent testifies regarding the use of code
words in a drug transaction," the Advisory Committee's
note directs judges to subject experience-based expertise
to heightened scrutiny. "[When] the witness is relying
solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must
explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the
opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the
facts. The trial court's gate keeping function requires more
than simply taking the expert's word for it." (FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.) This makes sense
because experience-based opinions are personal, idiosyn-
cratic, and subjective. These opinions are often difficult, if
not impossible, to objectively test. Judges who are strug-
gling to assess the reliability of experience-based exper-
tise pretrial should anticipate that these problems may be
exacerbated if the witness testifies because "the practical
K--Unlike
result is that the [experience-based expert] witness is
immunized against effective cross-examination." (DAVID
L. FAIGMAN ET AL. SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE
ISSUES 16 (2002).) Judges should also assume that jurors
will have even greater difficulties viewing police opinion
testimony with appropriate skepticism.
Judges flummoxed by the task of assessing the reliabil-
ity of experience-based expertise should be urged to con-
sider three commonsense suggestions. First, some effort to
test the reliability of any expert's opinions is better than
none at all. Second, one might simply follow Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Breyer's suggestion that whenever
a judge is confronted with a "witness [who] is relying
solely or primarily on experience," the judge should
require the witness to "explain how that experience leads
to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a suffi-
cient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is
reliably applied to the facts."
(Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.) This
inquiry is essential because
mliOst "[tlhe trial court's gate keeping
function requires more than
simply taking the expert's
word for it." (Id.) Third, judges
could rely on some very recent
federal appellate case law to
help identify valid drug jargon
testimony.
J In United States v.
Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076 (9th
Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to subject drug jargon expert testimony to
a fairly rigorous analysis under amended Rule 702. The
court explicitly condemned the case-specific drug jargon
translations provided by the lead investigator, FBI Special
Agent John Broderick, who opined on the modus operandi
of cocaine enterprises and interpreted many of the words
used in intercepted telephone conversations among the
five codefendants. (Id. at 1083.) All of these words were
translated as references either to cocaine or associated
drug trafficking activities. (Id. at 1090-92.)
According to the Hermanek court, Agent Broderick's
testimony should never have been allowed because the
alleged drug code was not commonly used drug terminol-
ogy, but was unique to this conspiracy. (Id. at 1090-92.)
The trial court made no effort to establish "the reliability
of Broderick's methods for interpreting new words as
code for cocaine." (Id. at 1090.) The court should have
ascertained the validity of Broderick's methodology,
because this inquiry is "a prerequisite to making the Rule
702 determination that an expert's methods are reliable."
(Id. at 1094.)
Defense counsel should urge judges to read Hermanek
along with the Second Circuit's finding that drug jargon
CRIMINAL JUSTICE * Winter 2006
scientific expertise,
drug jargon expertise
is experience-based. I
experts must be restricted to interpreting "words of the
trade, jargon, and the general practices of drug dealers."
(Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 50.)
Defense counsel must also be aware of the dichotomy
between general and specific reliability. Opinion testi-
mony that draws from an area of general reliability is
inadmissible if it involves the unreliable application of
reliable methodology. Consider that even a well-recog-
nized expert in a legitimate science, such as biochem-
istry, could offer unreliable testimony for a number of
reasons. Although some commentators persuasively
argue that general and specific reliability are inevitably
intertwined (see Ronald J. Allen, Expert Admissibility
Symposium: What Is the Question? What Is the Answer?
How Should the Court Frame a Question to Which
Standards of Reliability Are to Be Applied? 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1 (2003)), at least in Kumho, the Supreme
Court has focused attention on the question of specific
reliability by framing the pretrial inquiry as a "deci[sion]
whether this particular expert
had sufficient specialized
knowledge to assist the
jurors in deciding the partic-
ular issues in the case."
(Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156.)
The emphasis on specific
reliability is echoed in the
Ninth Circuit's requirement
that an expert "explain how
he used any of his knowl-
Nonex
testimony
the disc
rule
edge or experience with drug
trafficking or with these
defendants to interpret particular words and phrases used
in specific conversations." (Hermanek, 289 F.3d at
1094.) Unless the government can convince the court
that the testimony will be valid by presenting a satisfac-
tory "explanation of his general methods" and of how
the expert applied this methodology to "interpret particu-
lar words or phrases," in this case, the opinion testimony
should be excluded. If judges fail to do their gatekeeping
jobs, they allow the police expert to run amok, "inter-
pret[ing] cryptic language as referring to cocaine simply
because he believed appellants to be cocaine traffickers."
(Id. at 1096.) The Ninth Circuit has been quite clear that
this "circular, subjective reasoning does not satisfy the
Rule 702 reliability requirement." (Id.)
Nonexpert opinion violates Rule 701
Prosecutors cannot have it both ways. In the past, pros-
ecutors asked judges to treat drug jargon testimony as
"specialized knowledge" in an effort to attain the impri-
matur of expertise for their police witness and to free the
witness's testimony from the constraints of personal per-
ception. (See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188,
211 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318,
321 (5th Cir. 1997).) At the same time, prosecutors fre-
quently took advantage of judicial laxity to elicit drug jar-
gon opinion testimony from nonexpert police witnesses.
Prior to Kumho and the December 2000 amendment to
Rule 701, appeals based on the admission of opinion testi-
mony from nonexpert police witnesses were generally
unsuccessful. (See, e.g., Griffith, 118 F.3d at 322-23)
(drug jargon translation by DEA agent was admissible
although agent was never offered or qualified as an expert
witness); United States v. Ramirez, 796 F.2d 212, 216-17
(7th Cir. 1986) (drug jargon opinion testimony from
nonexpert federal agent was admissible and defendant
could not object because lack of qualification inured to
defendant's benefit).)
The common practice of allowing nonexpert police
witnesses to provide opinion testimony is a clear violation
of Rule 701 and the discovery rules and it should end.
Rule 701, on its face, specifically bars all nonexperts
from providing testimony based
on "specialized knowledge."
The rule was amended in 2000pert to "eliminate the risk that the
reliability requirements set forth
violates in Rule 702 will be evaded
through the simple expedient of
:overy proffering an expert in lay wit-
ness clothing." (FED. R. EVID.
701 advisory committee's note.)
S. Recent federal appellate cases
(with one notable exception)
support this plain language interpretation of Rule 701. In
June 2005, the Second Circuit held "that the foundation
requirements of Rule 701 do not permit a law enforce-
ment agent to testify to an opinion ... if the agent's rea-
soning process depended, in whole or in part, on his spe-
cialized training and experience." (Garcia, 413 F.3d at
216.) According to the court, nonexpert police testimony
of this type cannot be admitted because the witness "is not
presenting the jury with the unique insights of an eyewit-
ness's personal perceptions." (Id. at 212.) In a decision
that predates the amendment to Rule 701, the Ninth
Circuit anticipated that nonexpert police testimony (in
which the witness opined that the defendant behaved like
an "experienced drug trafficker") should be barred
because admission of this testimony would "simply blur[]
the distinction between Federal Rules of Evidence 701
and 702." (United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d
1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1997).) The court reasoned that the
"mere percipience of a witness to the facts on which he
wishes to tender an opinion does not trump Rule 702."
(Id. at 1246.)
Defense counsel should also be aware of a very recent
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misconstrued interpretation of Rule 701 by the First
Circuit. In United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25
(1st Cir. 2005), the First Circuit reasoned that police non-
expert opinion testimony describing the operation of drug
distribution points and how heroin is normally packaged
was admissible because it could be linked to the witness's
"experience in prior drug arrests." (Id. at 29.) This misin-
terpretation of Rule 701 would expand the scope of the
rule to allow any witness to provide opinion testimony as
long as the opinion was somehow derived from the wit-
ness's life experience. This decision is illogical and
directly contradicted by the text of Rule 701, the
Advisory Committee's note, and better-reasoned case
law. If Ayala-Pizarro had been properly decided, the
court would have limited the nonexpert's testimony to his
personal perceptions.
Nonexpert opinion violates the discovery rules
Judges who allow prosecutors to elicit drug jargon
opinion testimony from nonex-
pert police witnesses implicitly
condone the government's vio-T
lation of the discovery require- The s
ments of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure also er
16(a)(1)(G), which demands
that the prosecution provide a n i Im
broader discovery about expert
witness testimony than is j
required for any other type of
witness. Upon request, the
defense is entitled to receive a written summary of the
expected expert testimony that "must describe the wit-
ness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions,
and the witness's qualifications." Rule 16 is generally
intended to "minimize the surprise that often results from
unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continu-
ances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity
to test the merits of the expert's testimony." (FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16, Advisory Committee's note.) When the
defense is deprived of proper discovery, counsel has been
effectively prevented from questioning the expert's
authority, attacking the reliability of the expert's evidence,
and preparing any other necessary challenges. Although
the text of Rule 16(a)(1)(G) is quite clear, defense counsel
should note that, once again, the case law is not uniform.
The most useful case law comes from the Second
Circuit. That court has specifically recognized that Rule
16 is violated when law enforcement officers are allowed
to testify based on their expertise, "despite the govern-
ment's failure to indicate prior to trial that the prosecution
would call him to testify in such capacity." (Cruz, 363
F.3d at 196, n.2.) According to the Second Circuit, when
It
Ir
this occurs the government has "blindsided defense coun-
sel with this testimony and undermined the goals of the
... disclosure requirement." (Id.) However, the First
Circuit recently concluded that a trial court did not err by
allowing nonexpert police witness testimony regarding
drug jargon, despite the lack of compliance with Rule
16(a)(1)(G). (Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d at 29.)
Investigator should not be expert witness
When the prosecution relies on the expert opinion testi-
mony of the detective or case agent, admission of this
may violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Whenever the
investigator and expert are one and the same, the possibil-
ity of juror confusion increases because jurors will find it
difficult to discern whether the testimony is based on the
witness's general experience (and presumptively reliable
methodology) or on information that the witness garnered
from this case. (Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 54; see also United
States v. Garcia Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir. 2005).)
In these situations, jurors may
infer that the agent's opinion
ate i s about the criminal nature of the
defendant's activities is based
on knowledge that is beyonditled to the evidence presented at trial,
Cruz, 363 F.3d at 193. Unfair
art i a I prejudice is likely whenever an
expert strays from applying
y reliable methodology and,
instead, offers sweeping con-
clusions regarding this defen-
dant's activities. When this occurs, jurors may accept
opinions based on the specifics of one case, rather than the
witness's general expertise, in violation of Rules 403 and
702 and the state counterparts. (Id. at 50 and 54.) This is
also true when the investigating officer, who is intimately
familiar with the details of the case, discloses otherwise
inadmissible testimony in violation of Rule 703.
Juror confusion is exacerbated when a prosecutor
attempts but fails to impeach the witness as an expert,
thereby enhancing "his credibility as a fact witness"
(id.), or when the witness, who knows that the weight of
his or her opinions depends on the reliability of the
underlying facts deliberately or inadvertently mixes facts
and opinions.
If these risks are highlighted, perhaps judges will be
more responsive to future defense challenges based on
Rule 403. (See, e.g., United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d
635, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2002) (there was "no real possibility
that the jury may have been led to mistakenly credit
[Officer] Cronin's opinions as facts"); United States v.
Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting
the defense argument that the dual role prejudiced the
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defendant by creating "the false impression that the
agent's opinion regarding the criminal nature of the defen-
dants' coded language was based on his investigation of
the defendants, rather than on generalizations from other
experiences").)
Jargon evidence violates propensity ban
Even helpful and reliable drug jargon expert testimony must
be excluded if it violates the ban on propensity evidence. (FED.
R. EvID. RuLE 404(a).) Such evidence arguably violates Rule
404(a) if jurors infer that, because defendants must have
learned drug jargon while conmitting prior crimes or bad acts,
they have a propensity to commit drug crimes. This type of
"bad character" evidence encourages jurors to convict defen-
dants simply because they assumed that the defendants are
criminals-regardless of whether or not the prosecutor has met
the burden of proof. The risk of a propensity assumption in-
creases when the charged crime and the alleged prior crimes
and bad acts are all drug offenses.
Defense lawyers should consider the possible strategic
benefits of a propensity challenge. Should the prosecutor
respond with the argument that jurors will not necessarily
make the propensity assumption that the defendant must
have learned drug jargon by committing drug crimes, by
inference the government has explicitly conceded that
drug language is accessible to those outside the drug-traf-
ficking community. This opens the door to the defense
argument that, if drug terminology has entered the vernac-
ular and can be understood by those not in the drug trade,
expert testimony is not necessary, especially when bal-
anced against the substantial risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. In addition, in the close case where the court
may be dubious of the reliability of proffered drug jargon
expertise, propensity concerns may tip the balance in the
defendant's favor. Finally, even if the propensity argument
is not persuasive, the defense has laid the groundwork for
clear limiting instructions.
Prior crimes, bad acts should be inadmissible
Defense counsel should also be prepared to challenge
a related government argument that a defendant's objec-
tion to drug jargon expertise opens the door to admission
of the defendant's prior convictions under Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b). This question was recently
addressed for the first time by the Second Circuit.
(Garcia, 291 F.3d at 127.) In Garcia, the government's
evidence included a taped conversation between the
defendant and a cooperating witness. (Id. at 132-34.) At
the time of the conversation the defendant was an
asbestos supervisor, the witness worked in the asbestos
industry, and the conversation appeared to relate to an
upcoming asbestos project. Yet the prosecutor persuaded
the court that the defendant and witness were discussing
a coded drug deal. Although the defendant did not testify
at trial, the judge allowed the prosecutor to introduce
Garcia's 12-year-old conviction for cocaine possession
under Rule 404(b), over defense objection. (Id. at 135.)
The trial court reasoned that "the prior conviction was
admissible as a similar act to show knowledge and intent
of the allegedly coded language Garcia used to negotiate
the instant drug deal." (Id.) The Second Circuit did not
agree. (Id. at 137.) The appellate court held that "[t]he
government may not invoke Rule 404(b) and proceed to
offer, carte blanche, any prior act of the defendant in the
same category of crime." (Id.) According to the Second
Circuit, prior crimes are not relevant for the purpose of
establishing knowledge or intent under 404(b) when the
earlier crime: (1) was a long time ago; (2) involved dif-
ferent quantities of drugs; (3) involved different people;
and (4) did not clearly involve the use of drug jargon.
(Id. at 138-39.) Thus, Garcia provides direct support for
future defense challenges whenever these factual predi-
cates have not been satisfied.
Conclusion
Judges should be especially wary when any witness
bases opinion testimony "on his own subjective observa-
tions over the course of his experience, available only to
him and in their individual form now almost certainly
only imperfectly recalled, if at all." (Mark P. Denbeaux &
D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability:
How the Question You Ask Gives You the Answer You Get,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 52 (2003).) Personal opinions
should always be excluded when they are self-validating.
Judges who correctly apply the Daubert/KumholRule 702
standard (or its state equivalent) should exclude experi-
ence-based expertise, such as law enforcement drug jar-
gon testimony, unless the expert can "explain how that
experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how
that experience is reliably applied to the facts." (FED. R.
EvID. 702, Advisory Committee's note.) Currently, judges
are allowing prosecutors to present conjecture and specu-
lation disguised as expertise, while denying the defense
access to information necessary for effective cross-exam-
ination. Defense lawyers should be prepared to attack the
three basic assumptions that underlie general judicial
acceptance of drug jargon evidence and demonstrate that
this evidence is often unhelpful and/or unreliable. Drug
jargon evidence should always be challenged whenever it
violates Rule 701, Rule 702, the discovery rules, Rule
403, or the ban on propensity evidence. If we continue to
allow police witnesses to enjoy unfettered autonomy in
narcotics cases, how can we hope to rein them in when
the government decides to wage "war" on the next type
of crime? 0
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